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THE NEW YORK LAW CONTROLLING THE DISSEMINATION
OF OBSCENE MATERIALS TO MINORS
The Supreme Court, in Winters v. New York,' declared a section of the New
York Penal Law,2 which was essentially aimed at the control of harmful
materials to minors, 3 to be unenforceable because of its vagueness.4 However,
the Court did "recognize the importance of the exercise of a state's police power
to minimize all incentives to crime, particularly in the field of sanguinary or
salacious publications with their stimulation of juvenile delinquency."0 This
marked the beginning of a long and futile effort by New York legislators to
draft effective yet constitutionally acceptable legislation in this field.0 The
constitutionality of New York's most recent statute has not yet been decided.
the meeting competition defense from subsequent violators. See Bigelow-Sanford Carpet
Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) II 16800, at 21764 (Feb. 10, 1964) (dissenting opinion).);
(3) strenuous efforts to secure voluntary compliance; or as a last resort, (4) shifting the
responsibility for "policing" such violations to the Justice Department. Abby Kent Co.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) i 17310, at 22468-69 (Aug. 9, 1965). Whether intentional or not,
these suggestions only demonstrate the rationality of the Max Factor approach. Voluntary
compliance in highly competitive industries would be most difficult to obtain and preserve.
The Trade Regulation Rule procedure, while eliminating the meeting competition defense,
would still leave the administrative dilemma of enforcing the Commission's orders against
thousands of firms. Passing responsibility to the Justice Department might solve the
Commission's problem, but would not hasten the day when such unfair practices are
ended.
1. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 925, § 1.
3. The statute made it a misdemeanor to possess, with intent to distribute, "criminal news,
police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed,
lust or crime . . . ." Ibid. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520-21 n.1 (1948) (dis-
senting opinion).
4. Id. at 519-20.
5. Id. at 510. Such encouragement for state and local authorities to aim legilsation at the
protection of minors was reiterated by the Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195
(1964), where, although finding a motion picture not to be obscene, the Court indicated that,
had the conviction been based upon its exhibition to children, a different decision would have
resulted.
6. "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens . .. ." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 168 (1944). This indicates that the basis of such state power is the right to perpetuation
of the state rather than the protection of the individual, although it appears that the former Is
impossible without the latter. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878),
indicating that interference with matters of personal conscience, aside from its sodal Impli-
cations, is without the scope of the law. But see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The
Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391 (1963), indicating that the principle motivations
behind such legislation are notions of morality. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46
(1961) (dissenting opinion).
COMMENTS
I. THE BASIc AsSIsAlMToN
There is no conclusive proof establishing a causal relationship between access
to obscene materials and undesirable human behavior 1 To date, the prepon-
derance of research has been concerned with the effect of these materials on the
immature,s the group which appears to be the major target of such works.0 The
belief in the existence of such a causal relationship has had a strong motivating
influence on legislation in this field, most strikingly evidenced by the statutory
enactments of two states'0 which provide that
the publication, sale and distribution to minors of.. . photographs, [or] pamphlets
... devoted to the presentation... of illicit sex, lust, passion, depravity, violence ...
are a contributing factor to juvenile crime, a basic factor in impairing the ethical and
moral development of our youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the
state. [Therefore, the necessity of these laws] ... is hereby declared as a matter of
legislative determination."
7. But see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (194S), where the court stated:
"Neither the states nor Congress are prevented ... from carrying out their duty of eliminat-
ing evils to which . . . such publications give rise."
S. See Committee on Public Health, Salacious Literature, 39 N.Y. Acad. Med. Bull. 945
(1963).
9. There is substantial authority for the position that there is such a rclationrhip. See
generally St. John-Stevas, Obscenity and the Law (1956); Report of the New York State
joint Legislative Committee To Study the Publication and DLssemination of Offenive and
Obscene Materials, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. S3 (1964); Committee on Public Health, supra note
S; Fagan, Obscenity Control and MIinors--The Case for a Separate Standard, 10 Catholic
Law. 270 (1964); Green, Obscenity, Censorship, and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 U. Toronto
L.J. 229 (1962); Pornography: The New Black Plague, 54 Nat'I Parent Teachers 20 (1959);
Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography From the Alai], 26 Fordham L.
Rev. 70, S4 (1953).
For the position that no relationship exists, see Gerber, Sex, Pornography, and Justice 317-
19 (1965); Alead, Sex and Censorship iIContemporary Society, in New World Writing 7 (3d
Mentor Selection 1953); Legislative Memorandum No. 33 from Ayreh Nler, Executive
Director, New York Civil Liberties Union, to Governor Rockefeller, May 24, 1965. See gen-
erally Kronhausen & Kronhausen, Pornography and the Law 337-3S (1959), whre erotic
literature is claimed to be a valuable source of fantasy outlet for a disturbed individual, and,
therefore, the limitation of access to these materials would be more likely to bring about the
result it was meant to discourage. See also A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., S6 Sup. Ct. 975, 9S4 n.10 (1966) (concurring
opinion); Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 Wayne L. Rev. 655 (1964).
10. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:115-3.3 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Pen. Law § 4S4-e.
11. Ibid. The wording of N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:115-3.3 (Supp. 1965) is, in e .nce, identical
to the New York statute. Such an enunciation is designed to bring the control of thee publi-
cations within the police power of the state by making a determination, through the legifia-
tive body, that failure to control them would involve a substantial threat to the safety of the
community. Such a legislative determination is to be given great weight and raies a pre-
sumption of the validity of the statute. Gitlow v. New York, 26S U.S. 652, M6S-71 (1925).
That the welfare of the minor is sufficient ground for the exercLe of the power to restrict
speech appears to be a settled question. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-03
(1951), citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US. 153 (1944).
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In the most comprehensive study of this relationship, 12 findings developed
through empirical investigations failed to reveal any definite evidence of the
detrimental effect of this type of subject matter.' 3 It was, however, concluded
that
we should accept legal controls which seek to prevent that kind of commercial distribu-
tion which in essence multiplies the risks we may incur when obscenity falls frequently
and easily into the hands of the immature. Thus, we might condemn . . . obscenity
... which is either intentionally aimed at youth ... or which is carried on with reckless
disregard of the quality of the audience whose patronage is solicited.14
It appears safe to say that materials of this type have at least a deleterious
effect upon those sexually immature individuals who are already prone towards
sexual instability. Since the great number of variables which are instrumental
in personality development makes it unlikely that a strict empirical determina-
tion will ever be achieved, such legislation must be regarded as a preventive
measure which, when all interests are balanced, is a necessary oneY
II. THE GUmELiNEs ARE DRAvN
A. Vagueness and Scope
In Winters v. New York,'0 the Supreme Court stated that the acts prohibited
by an obscenity statute must be defined with sufficient clarity so that "men of
common intelligence [will not] . . . be required to guess at the meaning of the
enactment."'1 7 It was pointed out that the vagueness may result from confusion
either as to the persons within the scope of the statute or as to the nature of
the prohibited acts.' 8 The nature of either or both of these aspects, it was
observed, should be ascertainable from a reading of the statute's entire text or
the materials dealt with.' 9
Furthermore, a statute will be held unconstitutional if its scope is found to
be overly broad. In a case20 subsequent to Winters, it was observed that the
effect of a statute which made it a misdemeanor to sell to the public in general
materials deemed harmful to a minor would be to "reduce the adult population
.. to reading only what is fit for children."''2 It was therefore held invalid as
12. See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws
and the Empirical Evidence, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1009 (1962).
13. Id. at 1035.
14. Id. at 1040-41. (Emphasis added.)
15. See People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 582-84, 175 N.E.2d 681,
683-84, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 372-74 (1961).
16. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
17. Id. at 515. (Footnote omitted.) The Court distinguished between words well under-
stood through past usage (e.g., obscene and lewd) and such phrases as "massing stories to
incite crime." Id. at 518.
18. Id. at 515-16.
19. Id. at 518.
20. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
21. Id. at 383. See In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241, 247-48 (ED. La. 1960)
(dictum).
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being too broad in the scope of its restriction when viewed in light of the problem
which it was designed to remedy.22
B. What Is Obscene?
The landmark decision in the field of obscenity is Roth v. United States.-
While reiterating that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech or press," 2-1 the Court noted that, for subject matter to be obscene,
it must, to the average person applying contemporary community standards,
have a dominant theme which, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient in-
terest.25 It was reasoned that, since an obscene publication is utterly without any
redeeming social importance, the state's interest in promoting social order out-
weighed any benefit which could possibly be derived from it.20
This criterion was subsequently refined by a holding which interpreted the
test laid down in Roth as further requiring that the material go so "beyond the
customary limits of candor" as to be patently offensive.2 7
The requisite appeal to the prurient interest, as enunciated in Roth, was clari-
fied in a recent case2s which held that the appeal need not be, in all cases, to the
average member of the community as a whole. When it can be established that
the primary target of the subject matter is a "clearly defined deviant sexual
group,"29 the "average person" envisioned by Roth is an average representative
of that particular group rather than the general community30 Furthermore, the
22. 352 U.S. at 3S3. The statute was also challenged on the ground that whether a par-
ticular book was within its scope was to be determined by the reading of kolated p sges,
rather than the work as a whole, and that the test laid down to asccrtain guilt was too
vague. The Court chose not to examine these questions. Id. at 331-$2.
23. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
24. Id. at 485. See uinters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
25. 354 U.S. at 489. This definition of obscenity was adopted by the Court from the defini-
tion laid down in Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
26. 354 U.S. at 4S4. This definition has been interpreted by the New York Court of Ap-
peals as limiting that which is obscene to "hard-core" pornography. People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 57S, 5S6-S7, 175 N.E.2d 6S1, 63S-26, 216 N.Y.S-2d 369, 375-76
(1961). This is, however, an overly stringent view. See M Iishln v. Nev: York, SG Sup. Ct.
958 (1966).
27. This was the view taken in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 US. 473, 436-S7
(1962), by Mar. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart. Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Brennan and Douglas, concurring in the result, made no reference to this matter. It was
similarly ignored by Justice Clark, who dissented. Justices Frankfurter and White did not
take part in the consideration of the case.
28. Mlisbkin v. New York, S6 Sup. Ct. 95S (1966).
29. Id. at 963.
30. Ibid. The Court pointed out that the concept of the "average perzon," as employed
in Roth, was utilized for the negative purpose of rejecting the rule firzt promulgated in
Regina v. Hicklin, El6S] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360. S6 Sup. Ct. at 964. This rule made the teft
of obscenity whether isolated passages tended to corrupt the morals of thoze into who-2 hands
it might fall, thus making the criterion the effect on particularly susceptible pcrsons. See
United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 minn. L. Rev. So 53
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average member of the deviant sexual group will be determined on the basis of
the national group rather than by reference to any particular local sub-group.
As pointed out, obscenity is not entitled to the protection of the first amend-
ment and is subject to state restriction, even though it has not been established
that such material tends to induce anti-social behavior.3' This is significant
where the legislation aimed at minors is in the form of an obscenity statute 2
rather than a police power statute.3 3 In the case of an obscenity statute, the
material must first be proven to be obscene so as to take it out of the ambit of
the first amendment. A police power statute, on the other hand, enumerates the
proscribed materials rather than categorizes them as obscene, and, thus, the
only proof required is that the material sold was of the type enumerated. How-
ever, such a statute would be vulnerable to attack on the ground that the
proscribed materials were arbitrarily and unreasonably enumerated.
An obscenity statute utilizing a concept of "variable obscenity13 4 would
eliminate the need for justification of the restriction, as is true of all obscenity
statutes, without limiting the scope of the prohibited materials. Under such an
approach, the totality of the subject matter deemed objectionable for exposure
to a particular group would be classed as "obscene." This would have the dual
benefit of finding the material obscene, while incorporating within the statute
anything which could validly be enumerated in a police power statute.
New dimension was given to the Roth decision in Ginzburg v. United States."0
Petitioner was convicted of violating a federal obscenity statute which prohibited
using the mails to distribute "obscene" materials.3 0 The prosecution, conceding
that the subject matter in question might not be obscene, contended that it was
clearly within the purview of what is "obscene" when examined in the context
of its sale and publicity. Noting that the advertising of the publications was
permeated with the " 'leer of the sensualist,' ,,37 the Court reasoned that this
whetted the prurient appetite of the reader to an extent sufficient to cause him
to view the work as primarily catering to such a desire, notwithstanding its true
(1960). As noted by the Court in Mishkin, since the present "holding requires that the re-
cipient group be defined with more specificity than in terms of sexually immature persons
[in addition to having to be the primary target group], it . . . avoids the inadequacy
of the Hicklin test." 86 Sup. Ct. at 964. (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis omitted.)
31. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957).
32. E.g., N.Y. Pen. Laws § 1141 makes it a misdemeanor to disseminate any "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic, mascochistic or disguisting book. . . ." A pre-
requisite to guilt under this statute is a finding that the material is obscene, etc.
33. E.g., N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-f makes it a misdemeanor to sell a comic book with a title
containing the words "crime, sex, horror." Such a blanket restriction is enforced aside from
any determination as to whether the subject matter is obscene; the subject matter need only
contain the proscribed words in the title notwithstanding their nature or the context in which
they are used.
34. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 30, at 77.
35. 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
37. 86 Sup. Ct. at 946.
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nature.38 For similar reasons, it was felt that the presentation of the book drew
undue attention to its offensive parts and, therefore, heightened its offensive-
ness. 39 It was therefore held that
by animating sensual detail to give the publication a salacious cast, petitioners rein-
forced what is conceded by the Government to be an otherise debatable conclusion.
[I]n close cases evidence of pandering may be probative Vith respect to the
nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth test. o
Respecting works of a marginal nature, i.e., works other than hard-core
pornography, which may, nevertheless, be of an obscene nature, the circum-
stances of their dissemination to the public become an important factor in deter-
mining whether they are obscene. The utilization of such considerations would
seemingly create an endless flow of litigation, since every decision would be
limited to the facts of the case and would not be res judicata respecting a later
action involving the same material. However, this new consideration represents
the first tangible guideline in an area overladen with ambiguous generalities.
C. Scienter
Scienter is an indispensable element of proof in a prosecution under any
obscenity statute. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court a short time after
its Roth decision in a case4" in which the appellant was convicted of a violation
of a Los Angeles city ordinance which made it illegal to be in possession of
obscene materials in areas where minors were likely to congregate. - The or-
dinance, which contained no scienter requirement;' 3 was declared invalid on
the ground that the absence of such a requirement severely limits the public's
access to many acceptable works by discouraging booksellers from stocking
works with which they are not familiar. 44 Unfortunately, the Court chose not
to explain what sort of mental element is requisite to a successful prosecution. 3
38. Id. at 947.
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 948, 949. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.)
41. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
42. Id. at 148 n.1.
43. Id. at 149.
44. Id. at 153. Noting the attempt to analogize the statute at bar to statutes and ordinances
which dispose of such a requisite showing of knowledge, the Court observed that the case at
hand involved the abridgment of a constitutionally guaranteed right; whereas, in ca=es of
statutes involving pure foods, etc., there is no original constitutional inhibition against im-
posing prohibitions which must be overcome. Id. at 152.
45. "The circumstances may warrant ... that he was aware of what a bool: contained,
despite his denial.... We . . .do not pass today on .. .whether honest mistahe as to
whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity need be an excuse; [or] whether there might
be circumstances under which the State constitutionally might require that a bookseller in-
vestigate further .... " Id. at 154. In a concurring opinion, 11r. Justice Frankfurter noted
that public welfare offenses are exceptions to the rule requiring a shoAng of mens rea in
order to establish guilt. Id. at 162. A logical inference which may be drawn from this is that,
1966]
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Thus again, it was made clear that the effective inhibition of a supposed evil is
not by itself sufficient to make a statute acceptable, for, if it is any more en-
compassing than the realm of the legitimately prohibited, it is invalid.
40
D. The Community Standard
It was not until some years after the test for obscenity was laid down that
the Supreme Court chose to elaborate on the phrase "contemporary community
standards." The community is, as the Court said in 1964,47 the nation as a
whole.48 This, however, was mere dictum, 49 and, in view of the strong argument
for a local standard voiced in the dissent,50 it is unclear whether the standard
referred to was meant literally as a national one, or merely as a state standard,
as opposed to one varying with the particular community. In view of the Court's
statement that "the question whether a particular work is obscene necessarily
implicates an issue of constitutional law ...,,1 which must ultimately be decided
in the case of a statute specifically aimed at minors, such a requirement may not be necessary
since the entire concept behind the use of a state's police power is that it is done in further-
ance of the public welfare. Such a situation would be, to some extent, analogous to restrictions
against the sale of liquor to minors. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 296-60
(1952); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933). But see note 44 supra.
The problem of establishing the requisite intent under a statute aimed at the protection
of minors would be particularly imposing where the sale is made through the mails. Assum-
ing that it must be established that the defendant was aware that the customer was a minor,
the likelihood of a conviction would be nil, in the absence of an initial solicitation by the
defendant through channels primarily geared to reach an adolescent audience. If such an
offer for sale were made via a channel of general communication, it would be virtually im-
possible to accurately ascertain the true age of the customer. Therefore, if a conviction for
selling obscene materials to minors, based upon such a sale, could be sustained, the seller's
only recourse would be to halt such advertisements altogether. This would have the effect of
limiting material available to adults to that which is acceptable for children, a circumstance
which is sufficient to invalidate the legislation. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
46. The effect of such an overly broad statute has been described as burning down "the
house to roast the pig." Id. at 383.
47. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
48. Id. at 195 (dictum).
49. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court, which was joined in by Mr.
Justice Goldberg. Justices White, Black, Douglas and Stewart, concurring in the result, were
silent on this issue. The utilization of a local standard would appear to be the much more
logical approach in view of the enormous difficulty of establishing the existence of a national
standard, particularly in a case where there was a divergence between the community and
the national standards. See United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 168 n.14 (2d Cir. 1965).
Utah has attempted to finally settle this problem by providing that the community Is the
state. Utah Code Ann. § 76-39-11 (Supp. 1965). For an excellent statement of some of the
problems inherent in this question, see Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 952
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
50. 378 U.S. at 200 (Warren, CJ., Clark, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Harlan, also dissent-
ing, made no reference to the standard.
51. Id. at 188.
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by the Court, it seems likely that the standard they would apply would not be a
state or local one.-
III. THE PRIOR NEw YonJ LAW
Pursuant to the recommendations of a legislative committeem a new article
was added to the New York Penal Law in 1955.c- This article* made it a
misdemeanor to
willfully or lmowingly [give] . . . away . . . or [distribute] . . . commercially to
any person under the age of eighteen ... any pomographic motion picture . . . or
any book.., the cover or content of which exploits, is devoted to, or is principally
made up of descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality or which is obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting, or which consists of . . . nude or partially
de-nuded figures, posed or presented in a manner to provoke or arouse lust or passion
or to exploit sex, lust or perversion for commercial gain .... o
This statute, which was Section 4S4-h of the New York Penal Law, as inter-
preted, encompassed a broader scope of prohibited materials than section 1141
of the Penal Law,5 7 which makes it a misdemeanor to sell obscene literature to
anyone. 85 One court has held that the statute prohibited even materials of
bona fide literary merit.co This interpretation was adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals,' as to that part of section 4S4-h which prohibited the sale
52. It is suggested that the possibility of federal legislation in this area is worthy of in-
vestigation. There is little doubt that such regulation could easily be justified via the federal
government's power to regulate interstate commerce. It has already been establihcd that the
standard referred to in the federal obscenity statutes is a national one. Ianual Enterpricse,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 433 (1962). Such a statute would avoid pitfalls which are premlent
in state legislation.
53. 1955 N.Y. Leg. Manual 770. The Joint Committee on Comic Boo s, created in 1949,
was renamed The Joint Legislative Committee To Study the Publication and Dscemination
of Offensive and Obscene Material.
54. N.1. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 836.
55. The article contained four provisions, all of which were enacted into law. N.Y. Pen.
Law § 484-e (declaring that exposure to obscene materials created a danger to the state);
N.Y. Pen. Law § 4S4-f (prohibiting sales of comics containing certain words in their titles
or dealing with certain subjects); N.Y. Pen. Law § 44-i (divisibility proviion). Section
484-h, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 4S2, § 1, was found unconstitutional, People v. Kaban, 1S
N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E2d 334, 25S N.YS.2d 392 (1965) (per curim), and is no longer in
effect.
56. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 4S2, § 1. (Emphasis added.)
57. People v. Finkelstein, 156 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Blagis. Ct. 1955).
5S. Id. at 107. The court pointed out that, while all materials which would fall within
the scope of § 1141 of the Penal Law would be proscribed by the statute at bar, it does not
necessarily follow that the converse is true. Id. at 103.
59. Material falling solely within the scope of the statute aimed at minors was not con-
sidered to be obscene, but merely material which the legislature deemed harmful to a youth
(descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality, etc.).
60. People v. Finklestein, 156 N.Y.S.2d 104, 110 (lagis. Ct. 1955).
61. People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
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of materials describing illicit sex or sexual immorality,02 and, hence, this portion
of the statute was held to be so broad and vague as to be unconstitutional. The
court did, however, suggest that it was both desirable and possible to draft a
statute which properly prohibited that which is obscene for minors although not
obscene for adults.63 Such a concept of "variable obscenity,"0 4 although favored
by the federal courts, 65 had, until this time, been rejected by the New York
courts.66
It is noteworthy that a similarly worded Rhode Island statute 7 was held
62. Id. at 411, 201 N.E.2d at 15, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 434. "[Nlor does this clause in the
statute render it necessary to conviction that the material dealing with illicit sex or sexual
immorality shall have been presented in a salacious manner . . . . ETihe only construction
of which this statutory language is susceptible is that the subject of illicit sex or sexual
immorality is not to be brought before the young by pictures or writings-scientific, fictional
or otherwise . . . ." Id. at 415, 201 N.E.2d at 17, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38. Pursuant to such
a ruling, it appears clear that § 484-f, prohibiting the sale or distribution of comic books
"the title or titles of which contain the words crime, sex, horror or terror or the contents of
which is devoted to . . . methods of crime, of illicit sex, horror, terror, physical torture,
brutality or physical violence . . ." exists today only because the court has not had occasion
to rule on its validity.
An example of legislation in this area which offers an acceptable solution to the problem
is the Texas statute prohibiting the sale or distribution of any lewd, depraved, or corruptive
comic book[s]. Tex. Pen. Code art. 527b, § 1 (Supp. 1965). "Lewd comic book" is defined
therein as one depicting or portraying nudity, indecent exposure, or sexually suggestive activi-
ties. Tex. Pen. Code art. 527b, § 3(b) (Supp. 1965). "Depraved comic book" is defined as
one "depicting sadism, any gruesome crime, or any form of sexual perversion, or containing
profanity, obscenity, or filth." Tex. Pen. Code art. 527b, § 3(c) (Supp. 1965). A "corruptive
comic book" is one "containing material designed to create sympathy for a criminal, promote
distrust of law, teach methods of committing any crime, or material depicting evil triumphing
over good, or scenes of excessive violence, or containing advertisements for the sale of nude
pictures, sex instruction books, knives, guns, or gambling equipment." Tex. Pen. Code art.
527b, § 3(d) (Supp. 1965). Explicit exemptions are made for the factual reporting of current
events, or matter used for religious, educational, or scientific purposes. Tex. Pen. Code art.
527b, § 4 (Supp. 1965). Such a statute, when coupled with a proper scienter requisite, would
appear to remedy the flaws which the court of appeals found in the New York statute.
63. See People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 409, 416-17, 201 N.E.2d 14, 18, 252 N.Y.S.2d
433, 438-39 (1964).
64. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 30, at 77.
65. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964); United States v. 31 Photographs,
156 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), 7 Kan. L. Rev. 216 (1958) (hard-core pornography
sent to social scientists for study) ; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964) (dissenting
opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (concurring opinion); Note, 34
Ind. L.J. 426 (1959).
66. People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 125, 192 N.E.2d 713, 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7 (1963);
see Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 834, 846-47
(1964).
67. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-31-10 (Supp. 1965). The United States Supreme Court
noted that this statute was a good example of properly drawn legislation aimed at the pro-
tection of minors. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 n.11 (1964).
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valid by the highest court of that state,63 which ruled that "the alternatives
mentioned [in the statute] are nothing more than examples of what is obscene
. ..YO and, therefore, the Roth standard of redeeming social importance applies
to these materials as well.70 While such an interpretation is a more satisfactory
analysis of the legislative intent than that offered by the New York court,-' it
too appears to be incorrect. The disjunctive "or" between the prohibition of
obscene materials and materials devoted to descriptions of illicit sex and sexual
immorality clearly indicates a desire to limit the latter, notwithstanding the fact
that they are not obscene by the standards laid down in Roth. The New York
court was correct in its interpretation of the statute to this extent, but it should
have noted, as the dissent pointed out,72 that the statute envisioned only those
materials which were presented in a salacious manner. It would appear, there-
fore, that, although the Rhode Island court found the statute constitutional, it
arrived at this result for the wrong reason.
In People v. Kahan,"3 the New York Court of Appeals held former section
484-h-4 unconstitutional in its entirety7 on the ground of vagueness. The court
felt that new legislation was desirable and possible70 since the statute, as drafted,
was "remediable both in respect of its substantive definitions and in respect of
scienter as to contents and the age of the customer."' The concurring73 and
dissenting7 9 opinions pointed to the fact that it was unclear whether "obscene,"
as used in former section 484-h, had the same meaning as in the general
obscenity statute.SO Paradoxically, it was this very differentiation in the meaning
of the word "obscene" when used in the context of a statute aimed specifically
at minors which the majority of the Rhode Island court relied on to find that
statute valid."' It would appear that the meanings of the word "obscene" as used
6S. State v. Settle, 90 RI. 195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959).
69. Id. at 200, 156 A.2d at 924. It appears that, if this were the function of the additional
phrase, then this would constitute a different meaning of obscenity, and would, therefore, b2
invalid because of its vagueness. See People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 313, 206 N.E.2d 333,
335, 253 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1965) (concurring opinion).
70. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen. of Mass., 86 Sup. CL 975, 979 (1966); Grove Pres, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d
433, 437-39 (2d Cir. 1960). These cases indicate that literary merit is evidence of social im-
portance.
71. People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.YI.2d 433 (1964).
72. Id. at 419, 201 N.E.2d at 19, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 441 (Burke, J., dissenting).
73. 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 253 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) (per curiam).
74. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 4S2, § 1.
75. It will be remembered that the statute contained a divisibility proviion which creates
a presumption of divisibility, rebuttable by showing the true legislative intent. Sea Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 293 U.S. 23S, 312 (1936).
76. 15 N.Y.2d at 311-12, 206 N.E.2d at 334, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
77. Id. at 312, 206 N.E.2d at 334, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 392. (Italics omitted.)
78. Id. at 314, 206 N.E.2d at 335-36, 25S N.Y.S.2d at 393-94 (Fuld, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 316, 206 N.E.2d at 336-37, 25S N.Y.S.2d at 395 (Burke, J., disz-anting).
30. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1141.
81. State v. Settle, 90 RI. 195, 19S-99, 156 A.2d 921, 924 (1959).
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in the New York statutes, were identical, for, had a difference been intended,
the invalid clause which dealt with "illicit sex"8 2 would have been mere sur-
plusage: all undesirable materials would have fallen within the scope of
"obscene" for minors.A8
In an attempt to fill the void created by the holdings of the court of appeals,84
the New York Legislature enacted, in 1965, two laws 5 designed to protect
minors and meet the statutory standards set down by the courts. 80
IV. THE PRESENT NEW YORK LAV
A. Section 484-h
Section 484-h, while lowering the age of those who fall within its scope to
seventeen years, s7 contains detailed definitions of the terms "nudity,"88 "sexual
conduct,"8 9 "sexual excitement,"90 and "sado-masochistic abuse."' The legisla-
ture chose to adopt the concept of variable obscenity,9 2 evidenced by the defini-
tion of "harmful to minors" as meaning
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors,
and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. 3
82. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 482, § 1.
83. Similarly, the fact that the meanings were the same results in some repetition, for a
conviction could be achieved under either statute. This, however, does not justify the inference
that the meanings were different since it is probable that the statute was intended to be a
comprehensive compilation of all those materials which could not be disseminated to minors.
84. See notes 57-81 supra and accompanying text.
85. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 484-h, -i.
86. Memorandum of the Governor, in N.Y. Sess. Laws 2101 (McKinney 1965); Memo-
randum of Assemblyman Burton Hecht, 1965 Leg. Annual 307.
87. N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(1) (a).
88. "'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or
buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less
than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the de-
piction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(1) (b).
89. "'Sexual conduct' means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or
physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if
such person be a female, breast." N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(1) (c).
90. "'Sexual excitement' means the condition of human male or female genitals when In
a state of sexual stimulation or arousal." N.Y. Penn. Law § 484-h(1) (d).
91. "'Sado-masochistic abuse' means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in
undergarments, a mask or bizare (sic] costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or
otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed." N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(1)(e).
92. See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 77 (1960); text accompanying note 34 supra.
93. N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(1) (f). (Emphasis added.) In conformity with the express
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This applies the Supreme Court guidelines for determining whether a particular
work is obscene,04 with the important qualification that the subject matter is to
be appraised in view of its potential effect on minors. The statute itself makzes
it a misdemeanor to knowingly 5 sell or loan for monetary consideration any
visual representation, printed matter, or sound recording of carefully described
typesP6 which is harmful to minors.37
Of the three criteria for determining harmfulness to minors, only the second,
i.e., whether the work is patently offensive in light of that which the adult
community deems desirable for exposure to minors, can be established with lay
testimony. The other two criteria, "appeal to the prurient interest" and the
existence of "redeeming social importance" appear to envision expert testimony
by those especially knowledgeable as to the unique problems and needs of this
group,9 S the existence of which problems are the basis for such specialized legis-
lation. 9 Nevertheless, these three criteria constitute a workable standard1
language in Roth, it would be advisable to add language to this Eubdivision that the work
"taken as a whole" must be "harmful to minors." See text accompanying note 25 supra.
94. See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 4S6 (1962); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 433-S9 (1957).
95. "'Knowingly' means having general knowledge of, or reason to kmov, or a belief or
a ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of both:
"(i) the character and content of any material described herein which is reasonably sus-
ceptible of examination by the defendant, and
"(ii) the age of the minor ... !" N.Y. Pen. Law § 434-h(1) (g).
96. See N.Y. Pen. Law § 494-h(2), (4).
97. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
98. "Although it may be difficult to find expert and other witnesses properly qualified to
inform the jury about what does or does not appeal to the prurient intert... it would not
seem impossible.... [TIhe jury was given no basis for understanding exactly how and why
the material appeals to its audience, whether deviate or average person ... P" United State3 v.
Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965). (Citations omitted.) See United States v. One Carton
Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "491", 247 F. Supp. 450, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; Smith
v. California, 361 US. 147, 165 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Model Penal Code
§ 207.10(2) & comment 12 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the
Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 334, 846-47 (1964).
The Model Penal Code requires that before a concept of variable obscenity be applied there
be a showing that the subject matter in question is directed primarily towards that group.
Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). Although such a !howving is
required by at least one state, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-414.1(a) (Supp. 1965), there ib no such
requirement under the New York statute.
99. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
10D. See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 47S1, 4S6 (1962) ; United States v. KEw,
350 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965). "A book can not be proscribed unleZs it is found to be
utterly without redeeming social value. This is so even though the book is found to pozeZ3
the requisite prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each of the three federal constitu-
tional criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the book can nither be
weighed against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or patent offeniveness." A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., C6 Sup. Ct.
975, 973 (1966). (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis omitted.)
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whose interrelationship concisely and logically evidences a single concept-
obscenity.1° 1
An interesting aspect of this apparent disparity among types of proof comes
into focus when viewed within the framework of the statute's scienter require-
ments. The necessity of showing that the disseminator had actual or imputed
knowledge of the "character," as well as the "content," of the subject matter
presumably refers to knowledge of the material's harmfulness. 10 2 Within this
"character" requirement, two basic factors must be established: that there is
reason to know that the material is harmful to minors, and that it is in fact
harmful to minors.10 3 While the latter requires expert testimony, the former is
most logically to be determined by an examination of the circumstances of the
particular case. And, if the material has been found to be patently offensive,
this burden of proof will also have been met.
The statute requires the inspection of any material which apparently merits,
and which is "reasonably susceptible" to, an examination. 10 4 Such a qualification
constitutes a major stride towards eliminating the danger of any "obscenity"
statute-that it will tend to curtail the availability of materials simply because
the vendor will not deal in works with which he is unfamiliar. Under section
484-h, the more blatantly offensive the material, the more warranted would be
an inspection.' 0 5 This represents a satisfactory balance between the interests
of the individual bookseller and the community as a whole.
The statute provides that an honest mistake as to the age of the minor is a
defense, provided that a bona fide attempt at its ascertainment was made.100
The existence of this clause exclusively in reference to the age factor raises the
inference that such a mistake as to the character and content of the subject
101. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
103. "[I]t seems desirable, indeed essential, that such appeal to someone be shown to
exist.... Nor should it be sufficient merely that the disseminator or publicizer thinks such ap-
peal exists. The stimulation and reaction with which the 'obscenity' laws are concerned are
unlikely to be a problem if the appeal is felt by none of the recipients, but only by the
disseminator." United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 1965). There does exist
separate legislation aimed at the individual who advertises inoffensive materials as though
they were obscene (although the advertiser is aware of their true nature). E.g., N.Y. Pen.
Law § 1141(1), (2), which makes it a misdemeanor to issue an advertisement stating where
one may purchase obscene materials or materials which purport to be obscene.
104. N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(1) (g).
105. See, e.g., People v. Schenkman, 20 Misc. 2d 1093, 1098-99, 195 N.Y.S.2d 570, 575-76
(Ct. Spec. Sess.), aff'd mem. sub nom. People v. Finkelstein, 12 App. Div. 2d 457, 207 N.Y.S.2d
389 (1st Dep't 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1961), where a paperback book entitled "Queen Bee" was sold for a price of $5.00. The
back cover contained the following: "'A tale that is wider [sic] and more sizzling than a
barrel of sly French novels. A Roman orgy is tame compared to some of the bedroom
scenes.'" 20 Misc. 2d at 1098, 195 N.Y.S.2d at 576. For a discussion of some elements which
are relevant in determining the existence of the requisite state of mind, see Mishkin v. New
York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958, 965 (1966).
106. N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(1) (g) (ii).
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matter would not be a defense. This is in keeping with a previous holding by
the court of appeals that, "when reasonable men may fairly classify a publica-
tion as necessarily or naturally indecent or obscene, a mistaken view by the
publisher as to its character or tendency is immaterial. 107 This aspect of the
problem has not yet been considered by the Supreme Court.los
Although it may be established that the subject matter was known to have a
deleterious effect upon minors and was consciously sold to a minor, it would still
be necessary, in order to sustain a conviction, to establish that it falls within one
of the described areas of activity.10 9 In view of this apparently over-restrictive
limitation, the possibility of language indicating that such descriptions are an
illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list of the types of restricted materials
would increase the effectiveness of the legislation." 0 In adding such language,
however, it must be borne in mind that inversely proportional to the scope of the
prohibition is the statute's vulnerability to being declared unconstitutional
because of its broadness or vagueness.'
B. Section 4S4-i
Section 484-i of the Penal Law, framed on the format of a police power
statute rather than an obscenity statute, -"2 makes it a misdemeanor to know-
ingly sell, lend, or give to a person "actually or apparently" under eighteen
years of age, visual representations or books containing depictions of those
activities described in section 484-h as "nudity," "sexual excitement," and
"sexual conduct." As a prerequisite to criminal liability, it must be established
that the material is presented in such a manner as to "exploit lust for com-
mercial gain" and that it appeals to the lust of persons under eighteen years or
to their curiosity as to the sexual differences between male and female.
Despite a clear indication by the court of appeals that knowledge as to the
age of the minor is necessary," 3 there is no such scienter provision in this
107. People v. Winters, 294 N.Y. 545, 552, 63 N.E.2d 93, 101, remittitur amended mem.,
294 1.Y. 979, 63 N.E.2d 713 (1945), rev'd on other grounds, 333 U.S. 507 (1943).
10. See note 45 supra. It appears, however, that, since a work must be patently offenive
in order to be obscene, there is little likelihood that a bona fide mistake as to its nature could
be established.
109. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
110. See Fagan, Obscenity Control and Minors--The Case of a Separate Standard, 10
Catholic Law. 270, 232 (1964).
111. See notes 16-22 supra and accompanying text.
112. The prohibition of sales "to a person actually or apparently under the age of eighteen.
years.. ." N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-i, is practically an exact prototype of the N.Y. Alco. Bev.
Control Law § 65(1), which imposes strict liability for the sale of alcoholic beverage3 to such
a person. Ross's Dairies, Ltd. v. Rohan, 10 App. Div. 2d 9S7, 202 N.Y.S2d E07 (2d Dep't)
(memorandum decision), appeal denied mem., 11 App. Div. 2d 714, 205 X.Y.Sd 3
(2d Dep't 1960).
113. In People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) (par
curiam), the court declared the predecessor to § 434-h to be unconstitutional, one of the




section. This deficiency, however, is overshadowed in light of the other serious
defects in the statute's construction.
All subject matter within the scope of section 484-i must be presented in such
a manner as to "exploit lust for commercial gain."11 4 This language directly
parallels that used in the predecessor" 5 of what is now section 484-h, which was
declared unconstitutional because of its vagueness.110 This is to be contrasted
with the second characteristic of the prohibited materials, which is appeal to the
lust of those under the age of eighteen years or appeal to their curiosity as to
the differences between the sexes.
The "appeal to lust" test, in light of the "commercial gain" test, indicates
that, in addition to appealing to the lust of a minor, the material must have been
disseminated with this intent. This "intent" requirement appears to be un-
constitutionally broad and vague. First, some materials recognized as genuine
works of art could be exploited for their lustful elements. Secondly, material in
the "gray area" may fall within the purview of the statute depending upon
whether the intent to exploit lust is deemed a subjective or an objective one.
These considerations, in addition to the fact that a statute containing similar
language has been held previously to be invalid," 7 underscore the deficiencies of
this clause.
The third requirement of section 484-i is that the material be concerned with
114. N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-i(1)-(3).
115. N.Y. Sess. Law 1964, ch. 482, § 1. This statute used the phrase: "posed or presented
in a manner to provoke or arouse lust or passion or to exploit sex, lust or perversion for
commercial gain .... 1"
116. People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) (per
curiam). Although this was a per curiam decision which held the entire statute invalid be-
cause of its defects in substantive definitions and scienter requirements, it may be assumed
that the particular phrase in question was within the scope of the court's criticism. See
Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5, People v. Tannenbaum, Index No. B 6770, N.Y. App. T., March
3, 1966. While the concurring and dissenting opinions focused their attention on the problem
of a possible dual meaning of the word "obscene," if this were the only problem, it could
have been resolved by severing that particular portion (which was merely connected by the
disjunctive "or"), rather than by declaring the entire statute invalid. Both the majority and
concurring opinions made blanket references to the statute when stating that there was a lack
of requisite clarity.
The Court, in Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966), employed language
similar to that appearing in N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-i, when it said that "an exploitation of
interests in titillation by pornography" may be shown. Id. at 950. However, this judicial
declaration cannot be used to prove the constitutionality of similar language which is utilized
in § 484-i. The Court's statement constitutes a new guideline for determining what is
"obscene," a concept which has already been held sufficiently clear for use in a statutory
enactment. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948). Furthermore, this guideline Is
to be used solely in reference to the circumstances surrounding the sale and publication of
the materials. The language utilized in § 484-i, on the other hand, refers to the nature of the
materials themselves. The mere similarity in language, used in two completely different con-
texts, lends no credence to the argument that the language of § 484-i is not overly broad or
vague.
117. People v. Kahan, supra note 116.
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the various forms of sexual activity described therein. This is indicative of a
legislative intent to give the individual a practical and workable description of
exactly what materials are proscribed. This has not been achieved. The use of
the conjunction "and" to connect all three criteria renders it impossible to
construe the described acts as being merely illustrative of that which is designed
"to exploit lust for commercial gain"; rather, it is a separate criterion. 1 0 When
read in conjunction with the other criteria, the vagueness of the statute still
poses a threat to its constitutionality.
Aside from the questions of vagueness, the prohibitions against the distribu-
tion of materials appealing to the minor's "curiosity as to sex or to the ana-
tomical differences between the sexes"' 19 is of more than passing interest.
Assuming arguendo that all of the requisites of the statute are valid and have
been complied with, it is extremely difficult to conceive of any court ever up-
holding this prohibition. Although it may be argued that this "curiosity" test
requires that the material be presented in a salacious manner, such a construc-
tion appears to be very unlikely, particularly in view of the penchant of the New
York Court of Appeals for extremely literal interpretation of this type of legisla-
tion. 20 There is, in fact, a very strong inference that visual materials need not
be presented in a salacious manner in order to fall within the scope of section
484-i, since the statutory language that the proscribed works "are to be dis-
tinguished from flat and factual statements of the facts, causes, functions or
purposes of the subject of the writing or presentation, such as would be found
in bona fide medical or biological textbooks . . ."-" appears solely in reference
to books and pamphlets. Aside from the "lust for commercial gain" test, such
works as Rodin's Cupid and Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel meet all of the tests
of the prohibited works.'2 2 Because of the vagueness of the commercial gain test,
the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected material is inherent within
the statute.
It appears, therefore, that the statute is defective as to its scienter require-
ments,113 it is too vague,'2 4 and it has the effect of prohibiting a much greater
scope of materials than is necessary.25 Those portions which are unsatisfactory
go so directly to the heart of the statute that it would appear to call for total
invalidation, notwithstanding the existence of a divisibility provision. 20
113. See note 116 supra.
119. N.Y. Pen. Law § 434-i(1)-(3).
120. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
121. N.Y. Pen. Law § 4S4-i(3).
122. See Legislative Memorandum No. 33 From Arych Neler, Executive Director, New
York Civil Liberties Union, to Governor Rockefeller, May 24, 1965.
123. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
124. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
126. Such a situation is analogous to that posed in Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 273
U.S. 235 (1929), in which the validity of a state statute fixing prices for the sale of gasoline
was challenged. The act contained a separability provision providing that if one section of
the act were held invalid, it was not to effect any other sections of the act. In holding the
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V. CONCLUSION
In section 484-h, New York has enacted what is essentially the best legisla-
tion ever passed in this field.1 27 The statute is broader in scope than section
4844, particularly since it establishes some control over the admission of minors
to movies or shows of the type which the legislature has deemed objectionable. 128
The clause applicable to movies and shows makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly
admit a minor to a show or movie which "in whole or in part" depicts the pro-
hibited activities and which is harmful to minors.1 29 Such a restriction is par-
ticularly desirable in light of the recent Supreme Court decision'30 holding un-
constitutional the section of New York's Education Law which provided for
the licensing of motion pictures. 131 These mass media have a significantly greater
separability provision to be ineffective, the Court reasoned that the rest of the act con-
stituted "mere adjuncts of the price-fixing provisions of the law or mere aids to their
effective execution." Id. at 243. Therefore, since the statute was enacted to accomplish the
single purpose indicated in the title, the entire act was invalid.
127. Compare Cal. Pen. Code § 311.3; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-244 (1958 and Supp.
1963) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 435 (1953); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6301.1 (Supp. 1965) ; Iowa
Code § 725.8 (1962); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 4183 (Supp. 1965); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:115-
3.2 (Supp. 1964); N.D. Cent. Code § 12-21-07 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.02
(Page 1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 3831 (1963); Utah Code Ann. § 76-39-5(6) (Supp.
1965).
128. N.Y. Pen. Law § 484-h(3).
129. Ibid.
130. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259 (1965) (per curlam),
reversing 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 242, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964) (reversing order), 14
N.Y.2d 722, 199 N.E.2d 165, 250 N.Y.S.2d 67 (amending remittitur).
131. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1927, ch. 153, § 122. The issue of prior restraints in relation to
motion pictures, i.e., the requirements that they meet certain standards before release to the
public, was presented to the Supreme Court in 1961, the sole issue being whether the basic
authority for the imposition of such requirements was valid. Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). In a 5-to-4 decision, it was held that the imposition of prior
restraints was not, in all circumstances, invalid. The Court, however, did not examine the
requisite characteristics of an acceptable law of this type, although, in a later case, it was
made clear that any such law bears "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
Exactly what criteria are to be utilized in the determination of the validity of a particular
statute was recently indicated by the Court when the validity of a Maryland statute requiring
all films to be approved by a Board of Censors before display to the public was struck down.
In summarizing the findings of the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion,
stated: "The Court ... holds that a system of movie censorship must contain at least three
procedural safeguards . . . (1) the censor must have the burden of instituting judicial pro-
ceedings; (2) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only briefly in order to
preserve the status quo; and (3) a prompt judicial determination of obscenity must be
assured." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61-62 n.* (1965). Accord, Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (upholding New York statute authorizing seizure of
"obscene" books). That the requirements laid down in the Freedman case may be met without
rendering the legislation ineffective is indicated by the recent approval, in dictum, of the
Maryland statute as amended subsequent to the Freedman case. United States v. One Carton
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audience than do books and, from all indications, have an extremely more pro-
found effect upon the minds of the impressionable. 1 2^
The scienter requirement of section 4S4-h is basically a satisfactory one, with
the exception that it makes a "general knowledge" or a "belief" a sufficient basis
for imputing knowledge. In view of the fact that this is a criminal statute of a
type which, at its best, potentially restricts the exercise of a consitutionally
guaranteed right, 33 it appears that the knowledge required to sustain a con-
viction should be considerably more specific. 134 Actual knowledge need not be
shown, but that which is deemed sufficient to put a disseminator on notice must
be greater than that which is ordinarily sufficient as a basis for imputing
knowledge.
While many obscenity statutes prohibit the exhibition of certain materials in
places frequented by minors, 35 there is no such provision in either section 484-h
or 484-i. Such a provision appears to be invalid in view of the fact that it would
result necessarily in the deprivation of materials which are unobjectionable for
adults, since these materials could not be displayed in any places frequented by
minors. This is in direct contravention of the rule laid down in Butler v.
Michigan. 36 There exists in New York a statute under the article concerned
with indecency, 37 which prohibits exhibitions tending to "demoralize the morals
of youth" in a public place. The peculiar location of this statute in the Penal
Law is apparently the result of a mere oversight by the legislature. However,
its apparent invalidity should not affect the validity of section 484-h.
Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "491", 247 F. Supp. 450, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For a
general discussion of the problems connected with motion picture anorhip, see Schumach,
The Face on the Cutting Room Floor (1964); Bilgrey, Some Questions Concerning Movie
Censorship and the First Amendment, IS Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 32 (1963); McAnany, Mo-
tion Picture Censorship and Constitutional Freedom, 50 Ky. LJ. 427 (1962) ; Verani, Motion
Picture Censorship and the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 3 Houston L. Rev. 11 (1965).
132. "Television's moving image accompanied by speech has a much more powerful and
immediate effect than the comic book picture with its printed text. Teleiion is infinitely
more life-like and suggestive, and the emotional reactions to it are therefore stronger ... A
healthy child who is immune to the influence of a strong emotional experience, whether
created by reality or by fiction, does not exist.l Mosse, The Influence of Mass Media on the
Mental Health of Children, NAFBRAT Quarterly (Summer 1963), quoted in Report of the
New York State Joint Legislative Committee To Study the Publication and Dissemination of
Offensive and Obscene Material, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 83, p. 49 (1964).
133. See notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text.
134. In People v. Shapiro, 6 App. Div. 2d 271, 177 IX.Y.S.2d 670 (2d Dep't 1953), a
showing that defendants, who had experience in distributing magazines, removed books from
cartons and rewrapped them prior to delivery to new.stands, and made a casual inspection of
covers which were clearly indicative of material of a harmful nature, was sufficient to over-
come a claim of ignorance of the nature of the subject matter. A careful reading of the
case indicates, however, that, except in extreme cases, merely glancing at the cover i not
sufficient to put the bookseller on notice.
135. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-244(b) (195); Iowa Code § 725.S (1962); Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-3601(1) (Supp. 1965).
136. 352 US. 3S0 (1957).
137. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1141-a.
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It appears, therefore, that, aside from the addition of a separability clause
such as that utilized in section 4844, and minor changes as to the scienter
requirements, and language making the list of prohibited materials illustrative
rather than exhaustive, New York has finally enacted an effective and a con-
stitutionally valid statute. While legislation of this type, in the absence of
effective industry self-regulation such as has been attained to a great extent in
the comic book industry,188 is necessary, it must be carefully- drafted so as to
avoid the infringement of constitutionally protected rights. It is the reconciling
of these apparently adverse interests which, until the present, has proven a true
statutory enigma.
138. The Comics Magazine Association of America is a voluntary, self-regulatory or-
ganization to which nearly all publishers belong. Its influence in controlling this area of the
obscenity problem has been most effective. See Report of the New York State Joint Legis-
lative Committee To Study the Publication and Dissemination of Offensive and Obscene
Material, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 83, p. 48 (1964); Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1955). North
Dakota requires a trial court to give "due weight" to approval by this organization. NJ).
Cent. Code § 12-21-07 (1960).
